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Group (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), which resulted from the merger 
of French company Aérospatiale-Matra, German company DASA and Spanish company 
CASA. The findings show that the balance of power depends not only on contextual factors 
and individual strategies, but also on cultural factors. The analysis highlights the importance 
of mutual understanding and cooperation for the success of intercultural management. 
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Power relationships concern the influence, persuasion and dependency within social systems 
as organisations and play a crucial role in multinational companies (MNC), notably in 
international mergers, associating companies marked by different cultures (Gertsen et al., 
1998; Søderberg and Vaara, 2003). There exists a remarkable variety of theoretical 
perspectives in the literature: most authors describe how power is distributed within 
organisations (Ghoshal and  Bartlett, 1990) using approaches like institutional theory (Gepper 
and Matten 2006a), social network theory (Freeman 1979) or organisational learning 
(Forsgren and Pedersen 2000).  
Research on MNC with a focus on power concentrates on the relationship between 
headquarters and subsidiaries, where the headquarters use this power in a hierarchical sense to 
stimulate change, innovation, and growth within their corporate networks (Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw, 2008), but also to demonstrate strength and control (Barmeyer and Davoine 
2007a).  Few articles take into account the social embeddedness and sociopolitical issues of 
international management (Geppert and Williams 2006b).  
The success of intraorganisational collaboration within MNC often depends on a certain 
balance of power between the associated entities. However, power relations are likely to 
change over time: relatively balanced relationships can become seriously unbalanced and vice 
versa (Barmeyer and Mayrhofer, 2008). The objective of this paper is to understand the 
evolution of power relationships and how it is shaped by national culture within operations 
combining stakeholders from different countries. The empirical study is based on an in-depth 
analysis of the EADS Group (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), which has 
experienced an important crisis six years after its creation. Several questions can be raised: 
has the balance of power been unequal since its creation in 2000? How can intra-
organisational events and the divergent behaviour of French and German stakeholders be 
analysed? Can we observe an evolution from bi-national to more multinational compositions 
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of governance systems and power relations? The empirical data collected is mostly obtained 
from secondary sources (annual reports of the Aérospatiale-Matra, DASA, CASA and EADS 
companies, internal EADS documents, press review), completed by interviews with EADS 
managers. The first part of the article examines the evolution of the distribution of power with 
the EADS group; the second part presents an analysis taking into account contextual, 
individual and cultural factors. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE EADS GROUP 
 
Created in the year 2000, the EADS group combines the activities of French company 
Aérospatiale-Matra, German company DASA and Spanish company CASA. The success of a 
merger is generally based on the existence of a common project and depends on a certain 
balance of power (Gertsen et al., 1998). It is important that stakeholders understand the 
benefits associated with merger and strive to achieve the objectives together. It has been 
observed that the issue of power relationships is more sensitive in a multicultural context than 
in a monocultural context (Barmeyer and Mayrhofer, 2008).  
 
The distribution of power following the creation of EADS: a balanced relationship? 
 
In light of the respective size of the Aérospatiale-Matra and DASA companies, the merger 
was primarily designed based on a Franco-German axis. It was founded on shareholding 
parity between France and Germany, which can be explained by the influential role of public 
authorities in this business sector, more specifically in the defence and aeronautical sectors, 
where national interests play a crucial role. The history of the partner companies, the strong 
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involvement of the State and the influence of European, national and even regional policies 
were dominant factors which affected the organisational structure of the EADS group. 
To comply with the Franco-German capital parity, the EADS group adopted the principle of 
symmetry in its managerial team. This symmetry was reflected by the appointment of two 
chief executive officers: France’s Philippe Camus (former CEO of Aérospatiale-Matra) and 
Germany’s Rainer Hertrich (former CEO of Daimler Chrysler Aerospace, DASA). The new 
company had a single head office in Schiphol, Netherlands, but was split between two sites: 
strategy and marketing services (headed by the French) were located in Paris, while finance 
and communication services (headed by Germans) were in Munich. To avoid duplication 
within the group, each function and each operating division was managed by a single person. 
Compliance with the balance of nationalities and skills resulted in relatively significant staff 
relocation. 
It is interesting to analyse the divisional and functional EADS organisation charts from the 
perspective of the balance of power. For the day-to-day management of the company, both 
Chief Executive Officers are assisted by an Executive Committee made up of the operating 
division directors and directors of the company’s three major functional departments. The 
Executive Committee is composed of eleven members (see table 1). 
 5 
Table 1: Composition of the EADS Executive Committee in 2000 
 
Philippe CAMUS (F): Chief Executive Officer 
Rainer HERTRICH (G): Chief Executive Officer 
Axel ARENDT (G): Financial Director 
François AUQUE (F): Space Division 
Thomas ENDERS (G): Defence and Civil Systems Division 
Francisco FERNANDEZ (S): Military Transport Aircraft Division 
Noël FORGEARD (F): President of Airbus 
Jean-Louis GERGORIN (F): Strategic coordination 
Jean-Paul GUT (F): Marketing 
Gustav HUMBERT (G): Airbus Operations Director 
Dietrich RUSSELL (G): Aeronautics Division 
 
 
It should be pointed out that, in 2000, the Airbus and Space operating divisions were managed 
by the French, Aeronautics and Defence and civil systems by the Germans and the Military 
transport aircraft division was entrusted to the Spanish. At first glance, the power seemed to 
have been evenly distributed between the French, Germans and Spanish. Table 1 suggests a 
certain coherence, but in fact the Chief Executive Officers and members of the Executive 
Board were based in their country and company of origin. This geographical dispersion was 
likely to reinforce “national” mindsets to the detriment of the emergence of a “transnational” 
mindset. Conversely, the unifying projects implemented by the human resource department 
facilitated exchanges between intermediate hierarchical levels. 
The realisation of the merger led to the reorganisation of the three companies’ subsidiaries, 
divisions and alliances into five operating divisions: (1) Airbus, (2) Aeronautics, (3) Defence 
and civil systems, (4) Space, and (5) Military transport aircraft. Table 2 indicates the 
importance of the different EADS operating divisions in 2000. From a strategic perspective, 
the Airbus division, which accounted for 64% of the turnover and made the largest profits of 
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all the operating divisions, seemed the most important. In this context, it should be noted that 
Airbus was headed by a Frenchman, Noël Forgeard. 
 
Table 2: Relative importance of EADS operating divisions in 2000 
 
Division Airbus Military 
transport 
aircraft 
Aeronautics Space Defence and 
civil systems 
Management Noël Forgeard 
(F) 
Francisco 
Fernandez (S) 
Dietrich Russell 
(G) 
François Auque 
(F) 
Thomas Enders 
(G) 
% of turnover 64% 2% 16% 8% 10% 
 
A company governed by Dutch law, the EADS group opted for a single structure, the Board 
of Directors, involving executive and non-executive members. This Board, responsible for 
company activities, is the second most important decision-making body after the 
shareholders’ meeting. The Board of Directors is made up of eleven members, appointed and 
dismissible by the Shareholders’ meeting. It includes an equal number of administrators 
proposed respectively by DaimlerChrysler and Sogeade (Lagardère, with French financial 
institutions, and Sogeade, a French State-owned holding company), one administrator 
proposed by SEPI (Spanish State-owned holding company) and two independent 
administrators. Table 3 indicates the composition of the EADS Board of Directors in 2000. 
 
Table 3: Composition of the EADS Board of Directors in 2000 
 
Manfred BISCHOFF (G): Member of the DaimlerChrysler AG Executive Board, Chairman of the EADS 
Board of Directors 
Jean-Luc LAGARDERE (F): General Partner, Lagardère SCA, Chairman of the EADS Board of Directors 
Philippe CAMUS (F): Chief Executive Officer, EADS 
Rainer HERTRICH (G): Chief Executive Officer, EADS 
Axel ARENDT (G): Financial Director, EADS 
Eckhard CORDES (G): Member of the DaimlerChrysler AG Executive Board 
Pedro FERRERAS (S): President, SEPI (Spanish State-owned holding company) 
Noël FORGEARD (F): President, Airbus 
Jean-René FOURTOU (F): Vice-president, Aventis 
Louis GALLOIS (F): President, SNCF 
Michael ROGOWSKI (G): Chairman of the Supervisory Board, J.M. Voith AG 
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The analysis carried out reveals that the creation of the EADS group was underpinned by the 
principle of symmetry. This symmetry resulted in the equal number of shares between France 
and Germany, the appointment of two Chief Executive Officers and the composition of the 
Executive Committee and Board of Directors, which include an equal number of French and 
German representatives. However, a slight imbalance at the operational level should be 
pointed out, as the Airbus division was managed by a Frenchman. It is tempting to examine 
how the balance of power evolved in the years following the creation of the EADS group. To 
do this, we shall examine the distribution of power in 2005 – a year marked by several 
attempts at challenging the operating procedures initially decided upon. 
 
Power within EADS since 2005: heading towards an unbalanced relationship? 
 
Shareholding parity between France and Germany, which was decided upon during the 
creation of the EADS group, has been maintained: in 2005, French shareholder, Sogeade 
(50% of whose capital is owned by the Lagardère group and 50% by the French State) and 
German shareholder, DASA (owned by DaimlerChrysler), respectively held 30.28% of the 
EADS group’s capital; 5.54% was held by the Spanish State and 33.9% was floating. Despite 
this balanced distribution of capital, challenges were being voiced concerning the balance of 
power within the EADS group. 
 
At the beginning of 2005, Noël Forgeard, the powerful president of Airbus and close friend of 
the President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, announced his intention to replace the 
Chief Executive Officer of EADS, Philippe Camus. Following this statement, which surprised 
the staff of the EADS group as well as the media, and following lengthy negotiations, 
Philippe Camus would step down. Noël Forgeard also proposed replacing the dual leadership 
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system with a single leadership system – French-style. German executives and politicians 
were alarmed by this unilateral takeover suggestion: the Germans believed there was a 
significant risk of losing their influence over the strategy of this European project. German 
Minister of the Economy Wolfgang Clement said: “I wish to thank Noël Forgeard for waking 
us up”. This fear that German executives would lose influence seemed justified. 
A few months earlier, French pharmaceutical group Sanofi had taken over Franco-German 
pharmaceutical group Aventis. Like ARTE and EADS, Aventis has always been a symbol of 
Franco-German intercultural complementarity and of the equilibrium of the European model 
(Eckert and Mayrhofer, 2005). Following this takeover, the German part of Sanofi-Aventis, 
resulting from German chemical giant Hoechst, was reduced to a production site of only a few 
thousand employees. After this experience, the German EADS shareholders, represented by 
DaimlerChrysler directors (such as Jürgen Schrempp and Manfred Bischoff) opposed Noël 
Forgeard’s project. The French eventually agreed with the idea of maintaining a Franco-
German co-leadership and Thomas Enders (46) replaced his German counterpart Rainer 
Hertrich, thereby becoming co-Chief Executive Officer of EADS alongside Noël Forgeard. 
 
However, Noël Forgeard continued to try and raise France’s profile within the group: he 
attempted to reinforce operating management by performing the joint functions of co-Chief 
Executive Officer of EADS and Airbus and proposing, should he be successful, the 
appointment of his French counterpart Gérard Blanc at the helm of Airbus. The Airbus boss 
had already been granted an exemption so that he could also sit on the EADS Executive 
Committee. This time, the Germans were opposed to Noël Forgeard jointly holding these two 
functions. 
After lengthy discussions between French and German shareholders and managers, 
Germany’s Gustav Humbert became the new president of Airbus at the end of June 2005. 
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Gustav Humbert, an engineer, developed his professional skills in the aeronautical sector over 
twenty five years. He started his career with DASA before becoming vice-president of Airbus 
in Toulouse, working with Noël Forgeard. For the first time, the European aircraft 
manufacturer was headed by a German. This French concession was offset by Noël 
Forgeard’s hierarchical supervision, as he was also appointed Chairman of the Airbus 
Shareholder Committee. 
To comply with the principle of symmetry, the EADS group continues to be co-chaired by 
two Chief Executive Officers: France’s Noël Forgeard and Germany’s Thomas Enders. Both 
Chief Executive Officers, appointed for a five-year period, are assisted by the Executive 
Committee which is made up of the operating division directors, the directors of the major 
functional departments and the director of the North American subsidiary of EADS (see 
table 4). The composition of the Executive Committee reflects the shareholding parity 
between France and Germany: there are four French and four German members (instead of 
five French and five Germans in 2000). As with the creation of EADS, one Spaniard 
(representing CASA) also sits at the Executive Committee. It should also be pointed out that 
the Executive Committee now includes an American and a Finn. Does this change reflect the 
group’s increasing openness and an evolution from a Franco-German to a transnational 
company? 
Table 4: Composition of the EADS Executive Committee in 2005 
 
Noël FORGEARD (F): Chief Executive Officer 
Thomas ENDERS (G): Chief Executive Officer 
Jean-Paul GUT (F): Chief Operating Officer (Marketing, International 
Affairs and Strategy) 
Hans Peter RING (G): Chief Operating Officer (Finance) 
François AUQUE (F): Space Division 
Fabrice BREGIER (F): Helicopters Division 
Ralph CROSBY (USA): North America 
Francisco FERNANDEZ (S): Military Transport Aircraft Division 
Gustav HUMBERT (G): Airbus 
Jussi ITÄVUAORI (Fin): Human Resources 
Stefan ZOLLER (G): Defence and security systems Division 
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The principle of symmetry was also maintained in operating divisions. However, the 
management of several divisions was replaced (see table 5). For example, Germany’s Gustav 
Humbert replaced Noël Forgeard at the head of Airbus. In light of the predominant weight of 
the Airbus division (60% of the turnover), it should be stressed that the operating power 
which was formerly controlled by the French, now shifted to the Germans. 
 
Table 5: Relative importance of EADS operating divisions in 2005 
 
Division 
 
Airbus Military 
transport 
aircraft 
Helicopters Space Defence and 
security 
systems 
Management Gustav 
Humbert (G) 
Francisco 
Fernandez (S) 
Fabrice Brégier 
(F) 
François Auque 
(F) 
Stefan Zoller 
(G) 
% of turnover 60% 4% 12% 8% 16% 
 
The principle of symmetry was also respected on the Board of Directors, made up of five 
French, five Germans and one Spaniard (see table 6). Compared with the Board of Directors 
elected in 2000, one important change needs to be emphasised:  unlike his predecessor, the 
new president of Airbus, Gustav Humbert, did not sit on the EADS Board of Directors. This 
decision could be explained by the desire not to upset the balance of national powers.  
 
Table 6: Composition of the EADS Board of Directors in 2005 
 
Manfred BISCHOFF (G): DaimlerChrysler manager for the aerospace branch, 
Chairman of the EADS Board of Directors 
Arnaud LAGARDERE (F): General Partner, Lagardère, Chairman of the EADS 
Board of Directors 
Noël FORGEARD (F): Chief Executive Officer, EADS 
Thomas ENDERS (G): Chief Executive Officer, EADS 
Hans Peter RING (G): Chief Operating Officer for Finance 
Jean-Paul GUT (F): Chief Operating Officer for Marketing, International 
Affairs and Strategy 
Rüdiger GRUBE (G): Member of the Management team, DaimlerChrysler 
Louis GALLOIS (F): President, SNCF 
François DAVID (F): President, Coface 
Michael ROGOWSKI (G): Chairman of the Supervisory Board, J.M. Voith AG 
Juan M. EGUIAGARAY UCELAY (S): Associate Professor, University Carlos III, Madrid 
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To monitor the balance of power, the principle of “cross-reporting” was imposed by the 
Germans: a French director of an EADS subsidiary must report to the German Chief 
Executive Officer; similarly, the activities of a German director of an EADS subsidiary are 
supervised by the French Chief Executive Officer. This two-headed system is designed to 
improve communication within the group and facilitate the decision-making process. It is 
based on the German concept of co-determination (Mitbestimmung). Spain is represented by 
one person only. 
 
Technical delays in the production of the A 380, caused by the delayed implementation of 
wiring harnesses and associated with the dispersion of production sites in several countries, 
were announced in June 2006. Combined with internal power struggles, they triggered an 
unprecedented crisis within the EADS group. The loss incurred due to the delay in the 
delivery of the A 380 undermined the trust in the group’s technical ability, which resulted in a 
30% drop in its share price. A few weeks before this drop, several executive managers, 
including Noël Forgeard, sold significant amounts of stock options, thereby negatively 
affecting their credibility. This crisis reflects EADS’s organisational complexity and the 
instability of power distribution, increased by the different perceptions of power and the 
coexistence of public and private interests within the group. 
 
After this analysis of the evolution of the balance of power, it is necessary to present the 
current situation in terms of who occupied the influential positions in the EADS governance 
system. The composition of the Executive Committee was radically altered after the departure 
of Noël Forgeard, forced to resign from his function as co-Chief Executive Officer of the 
EADS group and replaced by Louis Gallois, formerly President of SNCF (see table 7). To 
regain the trust of the shareholders and the general public, Gustav Humbert, the German 
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president of Airbus for only one year, also announced his departure. The Executive 
Committee, with eleven members in 2005, was made up of twelve people in 2006, which is 
still the case in 2010: France’s Jean Botti joined the Executive Committee to occupy the 
position of technological director. The number of French members (five) increased, but the 
number of Germans decreased to four managers. It should be noted that Louis Gallois jointly 
holds two management functions: that of EADS Chief Executive Officer and that of President 
of Airbus (where he is assisted by Fabrice Brégier, the former director of the Eurocopter 
division, as a Chief Operating Officer). 
 
Table 7: Composition of the EADS Executive Committee in 2010 
 
Louis GALLOIS (F): Chief Executive Officer EADS 
François AUQUE (F): Head of EADS Astrium 
Lutz BERTLING (G): Head of Eurocopter 
Jean BOTTI (F): Chief Technical Officer 
Fabrice BRÉGIER (F): EADS Operational Performance / Airbus COO 
Thomas ENDERS (G): Head of Airbus 
Jussi ITÄVUAORI (FIN): Head of Human Resources 
Marwan LAHOUD (F): Chief Strategy and Marketing Officer 
Sean O’KEEFE (USA): Head of EADS North America 
Hans Peter RING (G): Chief Financial Officer EADS 
Domingo UREÑA-RASO (S): Head of Airbus Military 
Stefan ZOLLER (G): Head of EADS Defence & Security 
 
The composition of the Board of Directors (see table 8) has changed a little but seems to 
counterbalance the changes in favour of French directors in the Executive Committee: Louis 
Gallois, already present on the Board of Directors in 2005, replaced Noël Forgeard; Fabrice 
Brégier, Chief Operating Officer of Airbus, does not sit on the Board of Directors. The total 
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number of members of the Board of Directors is eleven. The number of French members is 
equal to those of the German managers (each 4). It became more multinational and balanced 
with three managers from other countries: Great Britain (1), Spain (1) and India (1). The 
shareholder Lagardère Group is now present with two members. 
 
Table 8: Composition of the EADS Board of Directors in 2010 
 
Bodo UEBBER (G): Chairman of EADS 
Louis GALLOIS (F): Chief Executive Officer of EADS 
Rolf BARTKE (G): Chairman of Keiper Recaro Group 
Dominique D‘Hinnin (F): Chief Financial Officer of Lagardère SCA 
Juan M. EGUIAGARAY UCELAY 
(S):  
Director of Studies at Fundación Alternativas 
Arnaud LAGARDÈRE (F): General Partner and CEO of Lagardère Group 
Hermann-Josef LAMBERTI (G): Member of the Management Board of Deutsche Bank AG 
Lakshmi N. MITTAL (IND): President and Chief Executive Officer of ArcelorMittal 
John PARKER (GB): Chairman of National Grid 
Michel PÉBEREAU (F): Chairman of BNP Paribas 
Wilfried PORTH (G): Member of Board of Management of Daimler AG 
 
 
Concerning the evolution of the balance of power in the Executive Committee of the EADS 
group, two observations can be made (see table 9): first of all, the Franco-German parity 
effective from 2000 to 2005 – in terms of numbers – does not exist anymore. The French have 
the majority with five members compared with four Germans. Secondly, the Executive 
Committee has become more international since 2005, in light of the fact that EADS changes 
slowly from a Franco-German to a multinational company. 
 
Table 9: Evolution of the composition of the EADS Executive Committee 
 
Year Members French German Others 
2000 11 5 5 1 Spanish 
2005 11 4 4 1 Spanish, 1 American, 1 Finn 
2010 12 5 4 1 Spanish, 1 American, 1 Finn 
 
 
At the same time, two observations can be made regarding the composition of the Board of 
Directors since 2000, which alleviate the German public’s fear of a French takeover (see 
table 10): Firstly, as with the Executive Committee, there is no longer a Franco-German parity 
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– in terms of numbers.  In 2010, France and Germany are represented by the same number of 
top managers (four) in strategic power positions. Thus, the group is hoping to ensure the 
balance of power by counterbalancing the French influence in the Executive Committee. 
Secondly, the group’s internationalisation is now more reflected in the composition of the 
Board of Directors than in 2005. We can therefore observe over time an evolution from bi-
national to more multinational compositions of governance systems and power-relations. 
 
Table 10: Evolution of the composition of the EADS Board of Directors 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Year Members French German Others 
2000 11 5 5 1 Spanish 
2005 11 5 5 1 Spanish 
2010 11 4 4 1 Spanish, 1 British, 1 Indian 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER 
 
The power struggle within EADS (which involved French and German business executives 
and politicians) created significant deadlocks in the management structure and caused the 
group’s most serious crisis since its creation. For a better comprehension of the EADS case 
and of the strategies and behaviour of French and German stakeholders, a multi-level analysis 
of the balance of power was carried out. 
 
Factors influencing intercultural management situations  
 
Discussions have been going on for several decades about the institutional and societal 
approach (Maurice and Sorge, 2000; Whitley, 1999) and the cultural approach (Hofstede et 
al., 2010; D’Iribarne, 2009), but also about the individual strategic-actors approach of 
micropolitics with individual interests and hidden “agendas” (Crozie and Friedberg 1981; 
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Mintzberg 1983) to analyse and understand management processes in multinational 
companies. The cultural approach is often criticised for being too narrow-minded, determinist, 
based on mono-causality and ignoring other influential factors (Barmeyer and Davoine, 
2007b). The institutional approach does not consider implicit assumptions, values and 
interpretations of individuals and groups. The strategic-actors approach is criticized to be 
decontextualising and a-historical (D’Iribarne, (1994).  
Mayrhofer (2004), Sorge (1996) and Whitley (1999) propose a combination of the 
institutional and cultural approaches, taking into consideration political, social, economic and 
cultural institutions, using ‘national business systems’ and ‘societal effects’ approaches, seen 
as creating alternative paths of organising businesses and management (Geppert and Williams 
2006b). The authors underline the interconnection of macro- and micro-levels, that is the 
‘embeddedness’ of managerial practices in national systems. 
The different approaches are fairly complementary: the comprehension of consultation 
practices and hierarchical relationships within the company requires knowledge of the legal 
framework which governs corporate governance, co-determination and training systems. In 
addition, the history of a country, its identity and related set of values constitute a framework 
of reference which conditions and gives meaning to the stakeholders’ social practices, even 
within the organisation (D’Iribarne, 2009) and its actors.  
Based on this observation, the analysis of the EADS case can be carried out using a model 
which helps structure and analyse intercultural situations in a more balanced manner, taking 
into account cultural and institutional factors. Defélix (2001) proposes, following Pettigrew 
(1995), a “contextual analysis” which includes three variables: (1) the context, which 
concerns the environment of the organisation and its internal characteristics, (2) the content, 
which relates to its activity and (3) the process, which highlights the individuals’ action upon 
the evolution of the system. To analyse the EADS case, we shall use a similar approach, based 
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on the model proposed by Kinast and Schroll-Machl (2003), which underlines three factors 
influencing intercultural management situations: context, players and culture (see figure 1). 
These three factors interact and influence each other. Given the predominant influence of 
France and Germany in the development of EADS, we shall focus on these two countries. 
 
Figure 1: Factors influencing intercultural management situations 
 
 
 
 
 
A multi-level analysis of power relationships 
 
The first factor and element of the analysis is the context. Stakeholders live in an area linked 
to political and economic institutions, constructed by history (D’Iribarne, 1994; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Hancké, 2009; Hofstede et al., 2010; Whitley, 1999): ideas, strategies, 
intercultural interactions and work experience are at the origin of the EADS group, notably 
developed during a long cooperation phase between the aeronautical companies of the three 
countries. These companies have different notions of the role of the State in economic 
systems. 
In the German capitalism model, for example, established after the war, markets are 
“politically instituted” and subject to “society’s regulation” (Streek, 1996), in accordance with 
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Ludwig Erhard’s concept of social market economy (soziale Marktwirschaft) (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). This concept was inspired by the ordoliberalism doctrine of Walter Eucken 
and the Freiburg School, whereby economic and social order guarantees the smooth 
functioning of the markets and the State plays a central regulatory role to institute and 
maintain this order. However, the State must not get involved in corporate decisions 
(Bourgeois, 2005; Sattler, 2003). This is why the German State was not an EADS 
shareholder, unlike the French State which has been part of the group’s capital since its 
creation. In contrast to German stakeholders whose career does not alternate between the 
State’s political sphere and the private sphere of companies, French stakeholders are very 
closely linked to the State (pantouflage) and can therefore defend social and political 
interests. 
EADS is also a group with a European origin and identity, whose purpose has been since its 
creation to counterbalance the power of US competitor Boeing. Since Russian interests 
acquired 5% of EADS’s capital via the purchase of the Vnechtorgbank shares in the summer 
of 2006, managers and politicians – even in Germany – have been careful not to lose their 
influence over the group’s strategic decisions. As a symbol of Europe and synergy enabling 
cooperation, EADS finds itself at the centre of economic and political interests and 
reflections. 
The context also concerns political and social, even geographical aspects: the important 
number of production sites of EADS in Europe does not facilitate cooperation and 
coordination. Not only are the different parts, of aircrafts for example, often transported from 
one site to the other, but the site itself is a central location for job creation and security. The 
Toulouse and Hamburg sites have significantly benefited from the Airbus dynamic. The final 
assembly of the A 380 is carried out in Toulouse where a large number of jobs have been 
created. In light of the political and social issues, each country strives to attract as many 
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projects as possible to stimulate the reinforcement of the industrial fabric, the foundation of a 
region’s economic and social well-being. National choices sometimes override a coherent and 
efficient industrial logic. 
Due to logistical problems in the production of the A 380 model, which resulted in delayed 
delivery and extra costs, the context has become more difficult for EADS. Political and 
economic pressure weighs upon the group and its executives. The closing down of certain 
plants, job losses and the reorganisation of the group are delicate discussion topics. This 
difficult context affects Franco-German cooperation and intercultural management. It should 
be noted that specific cultural characteristics pose little problems in a favourable context but 
become problematic when there is a divergence in interests, opinions or objectives (Hampden-
Turner and Trompenaars, 2000). The issue of influence and power arises in these situations. 
How does the political and economic dimension of the context manifest itself? The EADS 
group, as a European and above all Franco-German microcosm, embodies different concepts 
of power via its employees: it was implicitly agreed that France would have the political and 
strategic power while Germany would hold the economic power. The fall of communist 
countries, the extension of Europe and globalisation recently upset this balance. Since the 
failure of the referendum on the European Constitution in 2005, France has lost some of its 
political power; Germany, for its part, is losing some of its economic power, partly because of 
the costs incurred by the reunification process. Due to the economic success of EADS, more 
specifically of Airbus, the German shareholders involved (DaimlerChrysler) are taking an 
increasing interest in this company which has traditionally always been managed by the 
French more so than the Germans. Furthermore, a new generation of German executives, with 
international training and experience (often in North America) and an easier relationship with 
power than the previous generation, has taken on important functions in German companies. 
The negative experiences of Franco-German cooperation, such as Sanofi-Aventis, Siemens-
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AREVA or Siemens-Alstom, have instilled cautious mistrust in the strategic mindset of 
certain German managers. Thus, the firm position adopted by German executives (like Jürgen 
Schrempp and Manfred Bischoff) is hardly surprising. Attempts by French executives to gain 
influence and power – notably through the management team and board of directors – have 
therefore been opposed by German executives. 
German managers have adopted a new attitude vis-à-vis EADS: in the beginning of 2007, 
DaimlerChrysler reduced its shareholding from 22.5% to 15% but retained its voting rights. 
Thus, the balance of voting rights between French and German EADS shareholders is 
maintained. The shares were purchased by a consortium of fifteen investors, seven of whom 
are from the private sector (Allianz, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Crédit 
Suisse, etc.) and eight from the public sector (KfW - Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau - Credit 
Institute for Reconstruction, financial companies and credit institutions from several Länder  
such as Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, Bremen and Bade-Wurtemberg). The German 
federal government, which refuses to get involved, welcomed this initiative which preserves 
the Franco-German equilibrium within Airbus and EADS. 
 
The second element of the analysis consists of the players who are at the origin of EADS’s 
political and managerial interactions, experiencing and mutually interpreting these 
interactions within networks (Crozier and Friedberg, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983). The French 
word for network is réseau. But where are important strategic networks built in France? 
Particularly influential are the elitist Grandes Ecoles, which exist besides the regular public 
universities. Grandes Ecoles are considered being the “talent hotbed” (pepinières) of the 
future elite in the fields of administration, management and engineering (Alexandre-Bailly et 
al., 2007). The Grandes Ecoles are known for their strong links to influential political 
institutions and companies. In general, graduates from the Grandes Ecoles get easily 
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employed in public administration or companies at a relatively high position without having 
undergone the process of professional in-house socialisation - Bauer and Bertin-Mourot 
(1996) compare this to “skydiving”.  
 
At first glance, the main players are the managers who are part of the company’s management 
team, notably the members of the Executive Committee and Board of Directors. Noël 
Forgeard can be considered a key player in the evolution of the balance of power. As former 
Chief Executive Officer of Airbus and EADS, he is the strategic architect of the A 380 model. 
Noël Forgeard’s career (see table 11) is a typical example of top French managers, alternating 
between the political and business spheres, referred to as pantouflage (Bauer and Bertin-
Mourot, 1996), which makes it possible to create influential networks. Noël Forgeard 
graduated from a Grande Ecole, worked as a civil servant before joining a major industrial 
group as a member of the management team. During his career, Noël Forgeard met with 
eminent and influential personalities such as Jacques Chirac, Jean-Luc Lagardère and Philippe 
Delmas, former advisor to the minister of Foreign affairs Roland Dumas, author of De la 
prochaine guerre avec l’Allemagne (The next war against Germany, 1999). Figure 2 presents 
some of the players in Noël Forgeard’s network. 
 
Table 11: Noël Forgeard’s career 
 
Noël FORGEARD 
Born in 1946 
Education: Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Mines 
 
1972-1978 : Chief Engineer for the ministry of industry 
1978-1981 : Technical advisor for the ministry of Transport and Defence 
1981-1986 : Deputy Director of Usinor subsidiaries, in charge of strategic reorganisations 
1986-1987 : Industrial affairs advisor to Jacques Chirac 
1987-1992 : Senior Vice-president in charge of Space and defence activities for Matra 
1992-1998 : Managing Director for the Lagardère group 
1998-2000 : Chief Executive Officer for Airbus Industries 
2000-2006 : Member of the EADS Executive Board and Chief Executive Officer of Airbus 
2005 : Replaces Philippe Camus as co-Chief Executive Officer of EADS 
2006 : Resigns from EADS 
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Figure 2: Noël Forgeard’s network 
 
 
 
Of course, there are also influential networks in Germany, but the links between the private 
sector and the State are much closer in France than in Germany, in particular because of the 
centralisation of network heads in Paris and the decentralisation of networks in Germany, the 
Länder having significant power (they are responsible for economic, cultural and education 
policy) and because of the dissemination of major companies throughout the country 
(Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Cologne, etc.). In these decentralised structures, it is difficult to 
create a single national network between managers and politicians. 
 
 
What happened to the role of the players? Noël Forgeard is described by his friends and 
associates as an ambitious leader with a strong personality and firm sense of power. 
Encouraged by his success with Airbus, he claimed the position occupied by Philippe Camus 
at the helm of EADS. Philippe Camus and Noël Forgeard were “united” for a long time within 
the Matra group by their boss, Jean-Luc Lagardère. Tension between these two men became 
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apparent after Jean-Luc Lagardère’s sudden death in 2003. They each used their influence 
with the government: Noël Forgeard was a close friend of Jacques Chirac; Jean-Louis 
Gergorin, who supported Philippe Camus, had known Dominique de Villepin since he was the 
Minister of Foreign affairs. The conflict escalated as Noël Forgeard bypassed Philippe Camus 
to deal only with the shareholders. The media revealed the existence of an anonymous letter 
(“the Clearstream affair”) perceived as an attempt to damage Noël Forgeard. To put an end to 
the deteriorating internal situation, Arnaud Lagardère appointed Noël Forgeard Chief 
Executive Officer of EADS in 2004 and brought Philippe Camus back closer to him. 
Following the sale of stock options in 2006, Noël Forgeard was forced to resign from his 
functions; before the general public was aware of the A 380 delivery problems, the French 
executive sold his stock options – unlike his German counterpart Thomas Enders –, although 
he claims that he sold them in March 2006 before he became aware of the problems in 
May 2006. 
Crozier and Friedberg (1981) focused on players’ strategies within organisations. Their 
studies show that the personal strategies and tactics of the players who wish to obtain and 
retain power and influence are often as important in the life – and survival – of organisations 
as so-called “rational” economic and financial strategies. Thus, power plays modify the 
organisation’s formal framework and can even lead to malfunctions. The role of the players is 
not always well scripted; it tends to develop in uncertain and ambiguous areas which leave 
room for manoeuvre. Players keep their cards close to their chest and interpret the official 
rules of the game. Players are free to pursue individual objectives which do not necessarily 
match those of the organisation, even if common interests can exist. Power is a focal point of 
these strategic games. The behaviour of certain EADS managers and, above all, Noël 
Forgeard’s attitude, correspond with the strategic behaviour described by Crozier and 
Friedberg. While this approach is heavily influenced by the French organisational context, the 
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notion of power involves a universal dimension, insofar as gaining power and influence can 
be considered crucial as part of the management of an organisation. 
 
The cultural element completes the analysis of this balance of power and certainly plays a 
central role, as the players acting in a given context are heavily influenced by the cultural 
socialisation which has shaped the way they perceive reality, the way they think and act 
according to this perception (Geertz, 1973; D’Iribarne, 2009). Therefore, culture can be 
defined as an acquired system of orientations and references which underpins the values and 
habits experienced collectively by the members of a certain group or society, distinguishing 
them from other groups and societies (Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart, 1998)
1
. Each culture 
constitutes a resource, which offers to its members the possibility to modulate their acts either 
collectively or individually, by transmitting the “good practices” from a generation to the 
other (Schein, 1986). As d’Iribarne (2009, 310-311) outlines,“when national cultures are 
concerned, the aim is not to highlight the supposedly persisting characteristics of certain 
cultures. It is rather a matter of analysing how, within a given organisation, the encounter of 
people coming from different societies and with different habits leads to the emergence of a 
specific culture, understood as a common way of doing things.“ This definition integrates 
continuity and coherence aspects as well as dynamic aspects.  
We refer to the “cultural school of thought” which represents one of the different strategic 
schools. This analysis, which includes institutional and cultural dimensions, facilitates the 
identification – without making any value judgements – of the players’ expectations, 
perspectives and behaviour, sometimes enigmatic in intercultural interaction (Barmeyer and 
Davoine, 2007b). 
                                                 
1
 It seems important to note that this contribution does not focus on organisational culture, which can be seen as 
a subsystem of national culture: it constitutes a shared identity for members of the organisation, aids orientation 
and decision-making and shapes the actions of employees. 
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The most important institutional element for characterising the German management model is 
the professional relationship system based on which the dialogue between social partners was 
established. This system was implemented after the war, partly from the ordoliberalism 
theories aimed at providing an accurate definition of the regulatory framework required for 
major macro-economic and macro-social equilibriums, and partly from the desire to 
reinstitute democracy in German society, which required the promotion of an original form of 
industrial democracy. This multi-faceted institutional set-up resulted in a management method 
based on consultation and negotiated consensus. For years, this type of concerted 
management was regarded as one of the key success factors of the German model, ensuring a 
kind of social peace and the support of all employees for the company’s strategic objectives 
(Bourgeois, 2005). 
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The link with the organisation can be made using the most common metaphor for the German 
management model, presented as a “well-oiled machine”, by contrast with the metaphor for 
the French model, described as a “pyramid of persons” (Hofstede et al., 2010). This metaphor 
corresponds with a management model characterised by limited hierarchical distance and a 
significant reduction in uncertainty. The “well-oiled machine” is a particularly pertinent 
metaphor, not only because it coveys an instrumental and mechanical vision of the 
organisation. In the German organisation, control is not so much linked to hierarchy as to the 
strong compartmentalisation of responsibilities and efficient standardisation of work routines 
and processes (Child and Kieser, 1979). In addition, this organisation is characterised by 
collegiate relationships between the different hierarchical levels and a participation in and 
search for a consensus in decision-making processes. This concept of less pyramidal and more 
compartmentalised organisation can be analysed in different ways, using elements from the 
institutional context such as, for example, the vocational training system, the professional 
relationship system and the specific characteristics of the governance methods of Rhine 
capitalism, as well as using historical and religious elements based on which the notion of 
German culture becomes much more meaningful (Barmeyer and Davoine, 2007b). 
A socio-historical and institutional perspective enables the development – at least partially – 
of this idea of a less significant thirst for power in Germany than in France. We should keep 
in mind that the notion of power is influenced by history and that French and German players 
do not share the same concept of power. In France, power in itself has no negative 
connotation. It is present in the collective consciousness and is dealt with by the media. In 
West Germany, after the tragic and traumatic Hitler period, power and all notions of power, 
such as authority, influence, elite, the cult of personality (hero), national symbols, centralism, 
etc. had a negative connotation for several decades. The democratic process in West 
Germany, the introduction of fundamental law by the Allies, the challenging of any form of 
authority after 1968 (antiautoritäre Erziehung) left its mark on the collective imagination and 
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behaviour of West Germans, a mistrust of power amongst other things (Brunstein, 2000). For 
years, the subject of power was the object of inhibition, even taboo. German institutions have 
been profoundly affected by this attitude (Lasserre, 2005): a vast number of laws stress the 
importance of a balance of power. The constitution of counter-powers is apparent, for 
example, in the laws governing the organisation of the State and government (with a president 
who only has a representative role), in the federal system with the Bundesländer which are 
very independent and autonomous, in corporate laws (with the notion of Mitbestimmung or 
co-determination and the governance system with an Aufsichstrat, a supervisory board which 
leaves far less power to the Vorstandsvorsitzenden than to the French counterpart, the PDG - 
Président Directeur Général) or in participatory management practices (e.g. management by 
objectives, delegation principle). 
As mentioned previously with the metaphors for the German (“well-oiled machine”) and 
French models (“pyramid of persons”), it should be reiterated that the representations (mental 
maps) of executives concerning organisations, power and leadership vary from one country to 
the next. As part of a survey conducted by INSEAD amongst the leaders of different 
countries, Laurent (1981) showed that the representations of power are not identical in all 
countries. For example, in Latin countries – including France – the matrix structure seems far 
less accepted than in Nordic countries. The survey reveals that, in Latin countries, internal 
communication is often at a deadlock, that French employees were disgruntled, sometimes 
even unmotivated, and that the objectives of the organisations using a matrix structure were 
not achieved. The aversion to a matrix structure is particularly apparent for managers: “The 
idea of reporting to two bosses was so alien to these (French) managers that mere 
consideration of such organisational principles was an impossible, useless exercise” 
(Laurent, 1983, p. 75). In this perspective, it should be noted that the French managers of 
EADS had – unlike their German counterparts – deemed the dual management structure 
inefficient. 
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To understand managerial attitudes, it is necessary to resort to a historical analysis of French 
organisations. The single line hierarchical system in the structural organisation, very common 
in the culture of Latin countries, can be attributed to French executive Henri Fayol, while the 
Anglo-Saxon system characterised by several lines, based on the principle of the shortest 
path, originates from American Frederick W. Taylor. In 1916, Fayol referred to the “unity of 
command” in his famous book Administration industrielle et générale: “For any action, an 
employee should receive orders from one superior only. Such is the rule of “unity of 
command”, arising from general and ever-present necessity and wielding an influence on the 
conduct of affairs which, to my way of thinking, is at least equal to any other principle; 
should it be violated, authority is undermined, discipline is in jeopardy, order disturbed, 
stability threatened…” (Fayol, 1916/1956, p. 25). 
 
This quote refers to the cultural continuity of centralism which characterises many domains in 
France. Centralism represents the most efficient form of organisation for the structuring of the 
environment and the stabilisation of the social system, by contrast with German federalism, 
marked by several decision-making bodies with identical rights (Fukuyama, 1996). The 
central and personified decision-making body of a French Société Anonyme (limited liability 
corporation) is the Président Directeur Général (PDG) who jointly holds the functions of 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board of Directors. To highlight the 
different attitudes regarding power, Laurent (1983) pointed out that “the primary purpose of a 
hierarchical structure was to show everybody who had authority over whom”. While the 
leaders of certain countries have certainly validated this assertion, those of other countries 
have been opposed to it: 45% of the French people interviewed approved this statement while 
most of the Germans interviewed rejected this principle (76%), believing that company 
hierarchy corresponds first of all with the need to organise functions and tasks. 
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It is interesting to create a link between the expectations and representations of leadership and 
organisational structures: even though social reality is more complex and differentiated, 
Amado et al. (1990) have detected two opposite models: (1) the functionalist and 
instrumental organisation, widespread in the Anglo-Saxon management model, German-
speaking and Scandinavian countries and (2) the personalistic organisation, known in Latin 
countries such as France. The functionalist organisation, which is equivalent to a system of 
tasks to be accomplished, uses instruments encouraging participation, pragmatism and 
simplicity, such as the MBO (Management by Objectives) or the matrix structure. It aspires to 
a prioritised arrangement of the players’ functional responsibility. A functionalist organisation 
operates consistently and uniformly when goals and rules have been made clear: it does not 
require the presence of an authority figure. Conversely, the personalistic organisation is 
influenced by an affective and social orientation of the organisation, mostly perceived as a 
group of people and relationships to be managed. Its purpose is to ensure order and efficiency 
via the hierarchical clarification of authority relationships. Quick decisions, which pay heed to 
context, compensate for delays in the “bureaucratic system”. With regard to French 
management style and power relations, this means that procedures can be adapted as 
necessary to take account of current circumstances and problems.  
 
To understand these differences, the factors explaining the players’ behaviour and ideas must 
be studied. This is why value orientations play an important role in intercultural management 
research (Chanlat, 2005; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 2000; House et al. 2002). The 
cultural dimension of “hierarchical distance”, highlighted by Hofstede et al. (2010) provides 
an explanation: hierarchical distance is the precise perception of the degree of power 
inequality between the person who holds the power and the one who is subjected to it. 
Hierarchical distance relates to the level of centralisation of authority and level of 
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management autocracy. The members of companies in which power is unevenly distributed 
accept authority and dependence more easily. The studies carried out by Hofstede et al. 
(2010) and House et al. (2004) in the GLOBE-Project show that France is characterised by a 
greater hierarchical distance than Germany. The French notion of hierarchy is primarily based 
on status, a vertical dimension, and workplace dependence (D’Iribarne, 2009), which is 
apparent in the words supérieur (superior), responsable (manager), subordonné (subordinate) 
and cadre (executive). Conversely, the German idea of authority is essentially based on 
technical competence, a horizontal dimension, and factual autonomy, which is apparent in the 
words Fachmann, Führungkraft and Vorgesetzter. Therefore, the issue of power does not play 
a predominant role in Germany. However, according to the French perspective, the desire to 
“dominate” the EADS group may seem “normal” or “natural”. 
 
It must be emphasised that culture is used as a descriptive and interpretative category in order 
to present generalisations, to illustrate features and patterns and to find new explanations for 
phenomena (D’Iribarne, 2009); otherwise, we would be dealing with a form of cultural 
determinism which disregards the particularities of contextual features (situation, history and 
constellation of participants), as Heidenreich (1995, p. 254) stresses: “By no means can it be 
assumed, however, that national work cultures are an inherently consistent amalgam of 
patterns of interpretation and behavior, internalized by employees and subsequently 
characterizing their behavior at work.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since its creation in the year 2000, the EADS group has become Europe’s number one and the 
world’s number two group in the aeronautical, space and defence industry (Boeing being 
number one). Despite the evolution of power relationships, the company has realised several 
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ambitious projects such as the A 380 and has been able to achieve satisfactory performance. 
The analysis presented in this paper contributes to a better understanding of the balance of 
power in multinational corporations. The framework elaborated by the authors, focusing on 
contextual, personal (players) and cultural factors, allows to identify the underlying forces 
driving coordination processes within the EADS group. The evolution of power relationships 
over the past ten years does not solely depend on financial and political interests, but can also 
be attributed to the cultural origin of the partner entities. The characteristics of the French and 
German cultures can therefore explain different conceptions of power, leading to diverging 
behaviours. 
The analysis also shows the difficulties faced by managers, coming from different cultures 
and with an incomplete grasp of the other culture, to act in a strongly politicised context. It 
raises the issue of dual leadership, with the nomination of two chief executive officers, which 
seems to favour tensions and conflicts. A single leadership system, as it is used by a majority 
of companies, seems to provide the organisation and its economic activity with more stability 
than a dual leadership structure. The principle of symmetry adopted by EADS may be 
questioned, since it appears to be difficult to preserve equal relationships over a certain period 
of time. 
The empirical study highlights several research perspectives. It is necessary to examine the 
balance of power in other multinational companies to validate these tentative explanations. 
The analysis could thus be conducted in other cultural contexts. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to observe the evolution of power relationships over a longer period of time. This 
concerns also the evolution and shift in governance systems and power positions from bi-
national groups to more multinational groups. Finally, it would be interesting to assess the 
respective influence of the three analysed levels (context, players and culture) on the 
determination of the balance of power.  
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